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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING IS PROPER-
LY BEFORE THE COURT UNDER THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
This Court has previously recognized that to make 
an application for a rehearing is a matter of right. Cum-
mings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913). Never-
theless, plaintiff-appellant recognizes that this right is 
not absolute and that a petition for rehearing should not 
be utilized to challenge areas of the Court's decision which 
appellant merely disagrees with or considers unsatisfac-
tory. Nor should the rehearing be used to reargue grounds 
originally presented. Cummings v. Nielson, supra; Beaver 
County v. Home Indemnity Co., 88 Utah 1, 52 P. 2d 435 
(1935). The standard established by this Court in de-
termining whether a petition for rehearing is proper was 
expressed long ago in Brown v. Pichard, 4 Utah 292, 11 
P. 512, reh. den., 4 Utah 292, 9 P. 573 (1886) : 
"To justify a court in granting a rehearing 
it must be convinced that there has been a fail-
ure to consider some material point in the case; 
that there has been error in the conclusions here-
tofore arrived at; or that some matter has been 
discovered unknown at the time of the hearing." 
See also Cummings v. Nielson, supra, at 624, wherein 
the Court stated the following: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"When this cour t . . . has considered and de-
cided all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, un-
less we have misconstrued or overlooked some 
material fact or facts, or have overlooked some 
statute or decision which may affect the result, 
or that we have based the decision on some 
wrong principle of law, or have either misap-
plied or overlooked something which materially 
affects the result . . . If there are some reasons . . . 
such as we have indicated above, or other good 
reasons, a petition for a rehearing should be 
promptly filed, and, if it is meritorious, its form 
will in no case be scrutinized by this court." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The remaining points of this brief will adequately 
show that this petition for rehearing is properly before 
this court on the grounds that this court misconstrued or 
misapprehended certain material facts of this case in 
reaching its decision, certain law was likewise miscon-
strued, and finally there are adequate "other good rea-
sons" for rehearing the case — namely, the Court's opin-
ion has left uncertain whether Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
13(1) (e) (1953), is invalid or merely inapplicable to the 
narrow facts of this case. 
POINT II. 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT RAISES 
AND LEAVES UNANSWERED THE IM-
PORTANT QUESTION CONCERNING THE 
PRESENT VALIDITY OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 58-37-13(1) (e). 
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There are three separate sections of the Court's 
opinion which specifically discuss the possibility that the 
statute may be invalid, yet, the Court never resolves this 
critical issue. 
The third paragraph of the opinion begins as follows: 
"The section of the statute under which this 
forfeiture was accomplished, Title 58-37-13(1)-
(e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, either is in-
valid or inapplicable under the facts of this case 
for the following reasons . . . " (Emphasis added.) 
The first paragraph under Point III of the Court's 
opinion reads in part as follows: 
"The statute obviously can lead to the most 
absurd results, — a reason this Court consistent-
ly has pointed up as a valid reason for invalida-
tion of a statute, or a refusal to apply it under 
particular facts making such application ridicu-
lous . . ." (Emphasis added.) 
The second paragraph under Point IV reads in part 
as follows: 
"The most that can be said for this stat-
ute's efficacy or practical worth, much less its 
validity, was said in 1967, when the California 
legislature repealed its legislation on forfeiture of 
vehicles used in violation of narcotics laws . . ." 
(Emphasis added.) 
All three paragraphs raise the question of the Utah 
statute's validity but the Court never reaches a conclusion 
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in the matter. Unless this issue is resolved, law enforce-
ment officers and prosecutors throughout Utah will be 
reluctant to invoke the forfeiture statute even in cases 
involving the most flagrant narcotics law violator. 
Appellant submits that the Court, by questioning 
the validity of Utah's forfeiture statute, apparently over-
looked or misapprehended the case of Astol Calero-To-
ledo, et al. v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., U. S , 
94 S. Ot. 2080 (1974), wherein the United States Su-
preme Court recently declared the principle of forfeiture 
constitutional. In that case, Puerto Rico's forfeiture stat-
ute (which is virtually identical to Utah's) was in ques-
tion. See Puerto Rico Laws Ann. Tit. 24, Section 2512 
(a) (4). The summary of the Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 
case contained in Utah's dissenting opinion in the in-
stant case is a correct evaluation and reads as follows: 
"That principle (forfeiture as a method of 
law enforcement) was reaffirmed in a situation 
greatly more exaggerated than the instant one. 
After officers had discovered marijuana aboard, 
the Yacht was seized and forfeited pursuant to 
Puerto Rican statutes. The Supreme Court re-
jected the attack upon the procedure and the 
statutes; and particularly rejected the conten-
tion of deprivation of property without due pro-
cess of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
It is noteworthy that our Utah statute is more 
fair than the one under attack in the Calero-
Toledo case, in that under our statute the owner 
is given the opportunity to show his innocence 
and his interest will be protected." 
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In view of the United States Supreme Court de-
cision on this precise point, Utah's statute is valid on its 
face and should be enforced and the present uncertainty 
in the law created by the Court's opinion should be 
remedied. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37-13 (1) (e) (1953), AS AP-
PLIED TO THIS CASE LEADS TO AN UN-
USUALLY HARSH RESULT AND CONSTI-
TUTES AN ADDITIONAL FINE OR PEN-
ALTY IS BASED UPON A MISCONSTRUC-
TION OF BOTH FACT AND LAW. 
Paragraph 1 of Point I of the Court's opinion reads 
in pertinent part as follows: 
"I. The section [Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
13(1) (e) (1953) J, as applied to this case leads 
to an unusually harsh result, constitutes an ad-
ditional fine or penalty in connection with a 
misdemeanor — that of possession of marijuana." 
In support of this conclusion, the Court then states 
that it is "conceded" that the basis of the charge was 
that Mr. Price was in possession of "one ounce of mari-
juana." Appellant never made such a concession, and the 
transcript in fact makes clear that Mr. Price was not 
only in possession of more than one ounce of marijuana, 
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but was also in possession of numerous pills which he 
admitted were amphetamines: 
TRANSCRIPT (Officer Peotol), Fage 1: 
"I laid all the stuff containing contents of the 
sack on the hood of the patrol car and asked him 
(Price) if he could identify it and asked him if 
the other two passengers knew what was in the 
vehicle. And he stated no, that the marijuana 
was his, and I asked him if he could identify 
the pills and he said they are amphetamines." 
Testimony on pages 1445 of fha transcript shows 
that Officer Pectol had located a paper sack in the glove 
box of Mr. Price's automobile, and that the sack con-
tained two plastic bags of a substance which Mr. Price 
admitted was marijuana and further contained a pill 
box "containing several different colored pills" (admitted 
by Price to be amphetamines). Reference is also made 
to "a little leather type pouch with some more marijuana 
and also a little pill capsule containing red pills" ^T 1*>. 
The Court's notion that the automobile contained 
only one ounce of marijuana is probably due to the fact 
that the report of Mr. Bradley from the state toxicologic 
says that he received thirty grams (approximately one 
ounce) of plant material, canabis sativa (T. 12). How-
ever, Officer Pectol explains that he merely sent a "sam-
ple" of the total amount of drugs found in the automo-
bile to the state laboratory: 
TRANSCRIPT, p. 15 (Officer Pectol): "A. 
we dumped all of the contents on the desk in 
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the patrol office. Took a sample of marijuana 
and placed it in a plastic bag and taped it up, 
placed it inside of the yellow envelope. Wrote on 
the sample 1, my case number and what the 
sample was containing. Sealed that envelope, 
taped it and initialed it, and we did this to each 
of the different colored pills. 
Q. That was sent in to the state toxicologist? 
A. Yes." 
From the above evidence, it is clear that the auto-
mobile contained far more illicit drugs than merely one 
ounce of marijuana and that the one ounce figure repr-
sented a small "sample" of the total amount involved. 
Thus, the Court's decision that the forfeiture statute as 
applied to this case leads to an unusually harsh result 
is predicated upon a misconstruction of the actual facts 
of this case and for this reason alone should be recon-
sidered. 
Secondly, the Court concluded in Pbinfcs I and II of 
the opinion that the forfeiture statute is exclusively aimed 
at deterring transportation of illicit drugs for distribu-
tion. The second paragraph under Point II reads as fol-
lows: • 
"It appears obvious that the primary and sole 
purpose of the statute and the intent of the leg-
islature were directed exclusively toward the 
transportation of a controlled substance for dis-
tribution according to erstwhile law merchant 
principles, and not for personal possession and 
consumption." (Emphasis added.) 
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Appellant submits that the legislature never intended the 
forfeiture statute to apply exclusively to "transportation 
for distribution" type cases alone. The wording of the 
statute shows that the legislature also recognized the evils 
of mere possession or concealment of illicit drugs, and 
that vehicles could be used for these purposes as well. 
The language of the statute reads as follows: 
"(1) The following shall be subject to for-
feiture and no property right shall exist in them: 
* * * 
(e) All conveyances including aircraft, ve-
hicles or vessels used or intended for use, to 
transport, or in any manner facilitate the trans-
portation, sale, receipt, possession, or conceal-
ment of property described in (1) (a) or (1)-
(b) of this section . . ." (Emphasis added.) 
Had the legislature intended to exclude possession or 
concealment from the forfeiture provision the statute 
would have ended after the word "receipt." The use of 
the word "or" just prior to the word "concealment" and 
the placement of the commas in the statute are also 
significant in that these grammatical tools further show 
the legislature's intent to include under the act vehicles 
used or intended for use either to transport or possess 
or conceal illicit drugs. One illegal activity (transporta-
tion of drugs) clearly was not intended to work to the 
exclusion of other violations of the act. 
Appellant does not dispute that the transporting of 
illegal drugs is a far more serious offense than possession. 
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The entire Controlled Substances Act supports this con-
cept. However, unlawful possession of a controlled sub-
stance is also a violaition of the act, and the legislature 
clearly intended to include this class of offense under the 
forfeiture statute. 
Thus, it is submitted that the Court misconstrued 
the forfeiture statute and the intent of the legislature in 
reaching those conclusions expressed in Points I and II 
of the Court's opinion. 
Finally, the Court concluded that the forfeiture in 
the instant case "constitutes an additional fine or pen-
alty in connection with a misdemeanor — that of posses-
sion of marijuana." Appellant submits that while the 
forfeiting of an automobile certainly does constitute an 
additional financial hardship on the accused over and 
above the punishment imposed for being convicted of 
violating the Controlled Substances Act, the legislature 
fully intended to authorize such forfeitures (even where 
the value of the automobile exceeds the punishment for 
the offense). Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(8) (1953), pro-
vides as follows: 
"Any penalty imposed for violation of this 
section shall be in addition to, and not in lieu 
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanc-
tion authorized by law." 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court was 
faced with a "possession" situation in the Pearson Yacht 
Leasing Co. case, supra, where an expensive yacht was 
seized, yet the forfeiture was upheld. 
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Thus, the value of the conveyance or vehicle is irrele-
vant under Utah's forfeiture statute and should not have 
been considered by the Court in its decision. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT HAS ASSUMED A LEGISLA-
TIVE FUNCTION BY MODIFYING A STAT-
UTE OTHERWISE CLEAR ON ITS FACE. 
The court's role is certainly to interpret the law. 
However, it may not rewrite or disregard statutes that 
are dear on their face. In Howard v. Howard, 333 P. 2d 
417 (Oal. App. 1958), the court expressed the above 
accepted statement of the law and stated: 
"Any changes (in the statute) must come from 
the legislature. The court may interpret but not 
rewrite statutes." 
When the statute, as in the present case, is clear on 
its face the court errs by speculating that the legislature 
meant something other than what it said. In Wood-
rmnsee v. Lowery, 334 P. 2d 991 (Cal. App. 1959), the 
court cites approvingly 45 Cal. Jur. 2d p. 621 § 108 when 
it states: 
". . . it is equally true that where the meaning of 
a statute is clear courts "must follow the lan-
guage used and give to it its plain meaning, 
whatever may be thought of the wisdom, ex-
pedhency, or policy of the act, even if it appears 
probable that a different object was in the mind 
of the legislature." (Emphasis added.) 
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In the case of the statute in question, it is clear that 
an automobile used to transfer or facilitate the trans-
portation or possession of a controlled substance is sub-
ject to forfeiture. It is true, as the majority opinion points 
out, that a thrust of the statute is to control transporta-
ion of illicit drugs from one place to another. However, 
an equally important thrust, as indicated by the clear 
language of the statute, is to deter possession of illicit 
drugs. The wisdom of the statute may be questionable 
as well as the deterrent effect on the trafficking and pos-
session of illicit drugs. However, the language is clear 
and must be enforced by the courts. Other questions as 
to the statute's propriety and wisdom should be deferred 
to the legislature. 
POINT V. 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT DOES NOT 
ESTABLISH ANY WORKABLE S T A N D -
ARDS OR GUIDELINES FOR FURTHER 
APPLICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
THE FORFEITURE STATUTE. 
In light of this decision by the Court, the state offi-
cials responsible for applying and enforcing the laws of 
the State of Utah are presently in a quandry as to how 
to apply the Utah forfeiture statute. The legislature had 
drawn the line of enforcement of the statute to include 
use of any conveyance for the possession of illicit drugs. 
The Court now seems to say in a strict reading of its 
holding that one in possession of only one ounce of a 
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controlled substance whose car is valued at $10,000 can-
not have his car forfeited. The Court indicates that 
under those circumstances such a forfeiture is uncon-
scionable. But what if the possessor of the controlled 
substance has 2 ounces and his vehicle is worth only 
$9,000.00? At what point will the court be saitisfied 
that the forfeiture of such property is not an uncon-
scionable penalty? 
Appellant submits that the amount of the controlled 
substance and the value of the automobile are both irrele-
vant factors under the present Utah forfieture statute. 
No specified quantity of narcotics need be involved to 
result in forfeiture. People v. One 1941 Buick Club Coupe, 
165 P. 2d 44 (Cal. App. 1946), People v. One 1940 Buick 
Sedan, 162 P. 2d 318 (Cal. App. 1945). 
Nor does the statute require a purpose test before 
a conveyance is to be forfeited. Tourism as a sole pur-
pose for being in the state has no relevance to the mis-
demeanor of possession of an illicit drug. 
The decision as it now stands leaves both law en-
forcement as well as future offender guessing in regard 
to this statute. A clarification of this point is direly 
needed especially by the state officials entrusted with 
the enforcement and application of the narcotics laws. 
POINT VI. 
THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTE DO 
NOT DEVOUR IT BUT PROVIDE A PRO-
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TECTION FOR INNOCENT PARTIES WHO 
HAVE INTERESTS IN THE FORFEITED 
PROPERTY. 
The purpose of the statute is to act as a deterrent 
to possession of illicit drugs. There is little use in de-
terring innocent parties from doing something they are 
not doing. Therefore, in order to deal fairly with those 
who hold security interests who did not know of the illegal 
activity they were involved in, exceptions to the statute 
were included. The statute requires that the party who 
has the interest in the conveyance show that "he could 
not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
that the violation would take place in the use of the con-
veyance." The language of the statute would seem to 
indicate that the burden to show that one did not know 
of the illegal activity is upon the interest holder. 
The exceptions to the statute do not give the offender 
the right to drive freely through the state simply be-
cause he is not the owner, free and clear, of the vehicle. 
I t means that an innocent party's interest in the for-
feited vehicle will be protected. Upon a showing "that in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence" the holder of the 
security interest could not have known that a violation 
would take place, the interest will be recognized. In such 
a case the court should enter a judgment of forfeiture 
subject to the rights of the secured party. Upon presen-
tation of his claim the party can then be satisfied out 
of the proceeds of the sale of the vehicle. When the 
amount due the conditional seller of an automobile is 
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in excess of the value of the vehicle at the time of and 
after its seizure, the court should order the vehicle released 
to the lienholder instead of ordering a forfeiture of the ve-
hicle subject to the legal owner's rights. People v. One 
1957 Ford 2-Door Sedan, 325 P. 2d 676 (Cal. App. 1958). 
The above procedure insures that the deterrent effect 
of the statute is maintained in that the offender is no 
longer in possession of the vehicle and has lost whatever 
interest he may have had in it while the innocent secur-
ity interest holder who comes forth with a showing of 
his innocence is protected. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Court, in reaching its decision, misappre-
hended certain facts and law surrounding the case, and 
also because the opinion creates uncertainty in the law 
as to whether Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(1) (e) (1953) 
is invalid or merely inapplicable to the facts of the case, 
it is urged that the case should be reheard, reconsidered 
and the decision of September 18, 1974, be vacated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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